Home Alone Again

As the internet has been down for several days now, there's no photos in this post unfortunately. (I am at an internet cafe without my USB memory card.) My parents arrived to Dar es Salaam last Friday, which was nice. On Sunday the whole family - my parents, Danny and Sirkku, Benjamin and Daniella - left to Tanga, which is up north near the Kenyan border. They're participating in a one-week Disability Forum.

I had just visited Tanga, so I had decided to stay at home. We just moved into a new lovely house, so it was a good idea for someone to 'keep watch'. I have enjoyed my time alone. During the daytime I get a lot of work done. In the evenings I will have a beer and perhaps enjoy a Cuban cigar on the roof terrace, and just look at the stars and listen to the Indian Ocean greeting the star-lit beach with endless waves. But come weekend, it will be wonderful to see everyone again.

Christian Churches and Same-Sex Marriage

As everyone knows, the question of same-sex marriage is dividing the Christian churches. Anglicanism may be the nearest to blessing same-sex marriage and right to adoption, but Lutheranism, at least in Northern Europe, is not far behind.

As far as the Lutheran State Church of Finland is concerned, I predict it will follow Anglicanism’s lead within the next five to ten years. This will result in a break within the church, which will be of much greater caliber than when women’s ordination was introduced (1986), because the nature of the issue is one of (biblical) morality and not of church structure.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church, the Orthodox churches, and (most of) the Free Churches (Pentecostal, Baptist, etc.) are no way near blessing same-sex marriage. Against unrelenting critique from without and within Christendom the Catholics and Orthodox have held on to male-only ordination, so it is unlikely that these churches will ever succumb to the demand to bless same-sex marriages.

My intention here is not, however, to dwell on individual churches’ position in this heated debate, but rather to (1) mention the very dissimilar approaches between mainstream Lutheranism and Catholicism and (2) discuss a possible reason for how such different approaches can exist in the first place.

At the heart of this discussion is the relationship between human nature and human action, or being and doing.

Human nature vs. human action

Catholic teaching emphasizes the difference between “homosexuality” (noun) and “homosexual acts” (verb). It is possible that in some cases a person’s “homosexuality” is a voluntary decision: not determined by an inbuilt “necessity” but more the result of repeated homosexual acts and behavior resulting in homosexuality itself which, upon retrospect, may falsely seem to have been there “all along”.

However, as far as I understand the Catholic Church’s teaching, it admits that in some cases the opposite is true: a person may, from a very young age, be sexually attracted to one’s own sex in such a profound way that there is reason to believe homosexuality, at least in these cases, is inbuilt.

So far, most would agree. But this is where mainstream Lutheranism (and by the way, secularism) parts ways with Catholicism.

Mainstream Lutheranism holds that, since (or when) homosexuality is inbuilt in one’s “nature” (part of one’s being), homosexual acts and behavior are only natural and thus should not to be condemned.

Catholicism, however, does not arrive at the same conclusion. Catholics emphasize that involuntary homosexuality (noun) is not sin; but voluntary homosexual acts (verb) are. This means that, in theory and in practice, a bishop or even the pope could be a homosexual provided he does not lead a homosexual lifestyle. Every Christian has a “cross” to carry; for some Christians their cross includes coping with a homosexual tendency.

For a modern mind that does not distinguish between human nature and human action, such reasoning sounds downright absurd. For it the idea of homosexuality itself not being sinful but homosexual acts being sinful is unintelligible and unacceptable. Either both the nature and the behavior are sinful or, which is more probable according to them, neither is sinful.

What is behind such vastly dissimilar positions as regards the relationship of human nature and human action?

Tendency to sin vs. sin proper

I think I have traced one reason that allows for such a radical disagreement. I’m sure it’s not an exhaustive reason but it may be profoundly suggestive. It involves Christian anthropology (view of man) in relation to the doctrine of justification (salvation of man), or the doctrines of sin and grace.

The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine Justification (1999) by the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation was an ecumenical triumph. The Declaration stated that the centuries-old mutual condemnations the churches had proclaimed on each other in the aftermath of the Reformation over the question of justification did not apply to the agreement reached in this document. After many years of intense theological discussion both parties were able to proclaim that they agreed on the more fundamental parts of justification, and that the still remaining disagreements were not divisive.

The “still remaining disagreements” are of special interest here. In the “Appendix” to the Declaration added by the Catholic party are listed a few items that, said the Catholics, still divided the churches. One crucial point concerned the state of the forgiven Christian.

The Catholics stressed that, after repentance and forgiveness, a person is not sinful anymore; although the tendency to sin remains, condemnable sin proper does not exists until the person gives into the tendency to sin by actively sinning.

Traditional Lutheranism, on the other hand, stresses that the Christian is simultaneously both-sinner-and-justified; the tendency to sin that is always present is sin, just as sin proper is, although perhaps in a different way. Hence we are always sinning in one way or another, knowingly or unknowingly.

(Depending on which side one adheres to, the opposite side seems “unrealistic” and one’s one position “realistic”. Either the Catholic position is “falsely optimistic” or the Lutheran position is “falsely pessimistic”.)

Homosexuality reconsidered

Now, returning to the topic of homosexuality (noun) and homosexual behavior (verb). It seems that there is a certain parallel between it and the question of justification. The disagreement in the general question of justification allows for the disagreement in the particular question of homosexuality.

As regards justification, from the Catholic point of view the tendency to sin is not sin proper, only sinful acts are; but from the Lutheran point of view the tendency to sin is sin proper. This is the fundamental presupposition dividing the two. Hence, as regards homosexuality the Catholics are able to say that a homosexual tendency is not sin, only homosexual acts are. Lutherans, on the other hand, cannot make this distinction. For them it follows that either both the tendency and the acts are sinful or neither is.

And so, argues the mainstream Lutheran, we have two choices: (1) if the homosexual tendency is sinful, it means that the homosexual person remains sinful until he or she is healed from this tendency; (2) but if the homosexual tendency is not sinful, it follows that neither are the homosexual acts that spring from this (non-sinful) condition.

In a world where Christians are being encouraged (sometimes indiscriminately) to “love homosexuals”, it is only understandable that compared to the first grimmer option the second option looks more authentically “loving”. And so the State Churches fluctuate behind the States towards this latter “solution”.

For the Catholic Church, however, (1) and (2) are not the only options. In fact they are both false options.

For Catholics “loving the homosexual” does not differ from loving any other person. And loving a person means first acknowledging that some tendencies, though not sinful as such, are nonetheless disordered and unhealthy, and then encouraging the person not to “live out” these tendencies, but rather to seek transformation through intimate correspondence with grace.

-- -- --

Disclaimer: the “Lutheranism vs. Catholicism” juxtaposition above is not entirely accurate. Not only are there Lutherans who fall into the “Catholic” camp and Catholics who fall into the “Lutheran” camp, Northern/Western Lutheran churches tend to be far more “liberal” than, for example, their African sister churches. Also, as far as the question of homosexuality goes, my guess is that most Free Churches feel more comfortable with the “Catholic” position than the “Lutheran” position, even if in other questions the opposite is true.

Kawe-beach, Here We Come...

Due to several reasons my brother and his wife have decided to move. This means that I, the PhD-Nanny, will be moving also. Starting from today the next few days will be spent driving between the old house and the new house, packing, unpacking, cleaning, and so on. Thankfully we have a lot of formidable help.


The old house and its location have a lot of perks (like the swimming area in the picture above). But the new house ... well, let's just say that it's quite incredible too. Once the move is over and we've all settled in, I will post some photos. The view from the roof-size terrace, for example, is impeccable. From the edge of the backyard begins the beach, a white sand buffer separating the house from the blue, awe-inspiring Indian Ocean with a few tropical islands in the horizon.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

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Love as the Fulfillment of Doctrine

Simeon the New Theologian thought some monks needed to hear that “asceticism without love is in vain” (2:258). The same can be said to apply to doctrine: without love, true meaning and fulfillment of doctrine escapes us.

“Do not,” Simeon admonished his brethren, “try to describe ineffable matters by words alone, for this is an impossibility… But let us contemplate such matters as activity, labor, and fatigue… In this way we shall be taught the meaning of such things as the sacred mysteries” (2:258).

Just as doctrine is incommunicable apart from liturgy, doctrine is incommunicable apart from love. Love in action is the most appropriate way to articulate a truth that defies positive verbal formulation.

The “doctrinal explanations” of scholastic and speculative theology cannot do justice to mystical theology, because the ecstatic love that “consists in the experiential perception of the union of the soul, with God as its supreme object and goal, can in no way be communicated [tradi] through doctrine,” as Gerson put it (4:65).

Still it is essential to remember that there exists a tradition that does not separate, though it may distinguish between, “scholastic theology” and “mystical theology”; I hope to cling to this tradition. Doctrine needs to have experience as its “companion” (4:65).

But doctrine can “protect the experience”. For exacmple, as in the case of the mystical experience of union with God which, on the subjective level, can sometimes compromise the uniqueness of both God and the individual person (4:66). In this sense “mere practice” isn’t sufficient either (5:151-152). The truer the theology, the truer the experience.

However, in another sense the “right order of things” is “first do, then teach”, to quote Bede (3:13), for as earlier theologians have said, practice was the basis of theory. Gregory of Nazianzus’s epitaph of Basil the Great read, “his speech was like thunder because his life was like lightning” (5:55). This has served as a good guiding line for those who have wanted to hold on to the right relation between doctrine and life: thunder follows lightning.

Maximus distinguished between “commandments” and “doctrines”, and said the former were the prerequisites for the latter (2:8-9). Whatever the precise nature of the relation, at least this much is sure: the connection between orthodoxy and moral obedience has always been “a close one” (3:24).

Isidore of Seville’s comment about faithful preachers serves as a salutary model for all Christians in all times: “a shining example both in doctrine and in life,” for “the former without the latter made a man arrogant while the latter without the former made him useless” (3:13).

It is a shame to end this essay in a paradoxical accent. But the nature of things has not permitted any other way.

“The invisible things of God,” according to Hugh of Saint-Victor, “can only be believed, but cannot in any way be comprehended.” They transcend all analogy and likeness, whether of soul or of the body, and therefore “their very substance is the faith by which they are believed” (3:215). Or, as Balduinus said, faith was “the certain apprehension of unchangeable truth”, a comprehension that “exceeds all the experience of the senses and transcends all the conjectures of human reason” and that deserved to be called “knowledge” in the fullest sense (3:215).

Jean the Gerson’s approach was: “seek, through reasons based on the true faith, to understand the nature of God” and at the same time “hold principally to the love of God … without lofty inquiry” (4:63).

Doctrine is inadequate and inevitable; I must not inquire and yet inquire: Hier stehe ich und kann nicht anderes.

How to Eat an Elephant

This dialogue was from this morning. I was outside reading a 1000-page theological brick and I exchanged polite "goodmornings" with a South African elderly couple.

Couple: Are you studying?

Jason: Yup. I've been quite effective, but it feels like I'm slacking or "skipping class" because of the wonderful atmosphere here -- sun, warmth, birds, you know.

Couple: Do you know what the Africans say about how to eat an elephant?

Jason: No...

Couple: One bite at a time.

Jason: Thanks, I'll try to keep that in mind.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

Liturgy as the Fulfillment of Doctrine

There may be satisfactory answers to the questions in this essay, most of which have been left open. Some answers may even be expressible in words (the topic of the previous post)!

Whatever the case, it must be admitted that even the best answers and formulations do not suffice. This is consoling, for I am lacking the best answers and formulations.

For, as it is, undoubtedly some “nuances”, say, of christology are unintelligible to us “simple” people. But fortunately what is said of icons applies to liturgy in general: they are “books for the illiterate” (2:132). When words fail us, liturgy and love in action take over and fulfill what mere words, by themselves, were never meant to fulfill.

Throughout Pelikan’s monographs liturgy has been a main source (see e.g. 2:6); and throughout my essays I have mainly ignored it, as well as the “powerful monastic movement” (2:5-6) and several other important and intriguing elements in the history of the development of Christian doctrine. But now liturgy comes into play.

Earlier it was said that the central obligation of the church is the “communication of what has been granted” it (2:31). Liturgy (worship) is uniquely “the summit toward which the activity of the church is directed and at the same time the fountain from which all her power flows”, as was stated at the Second Vatican Council (5:295).

Maximus’s reminder of the words of Scripture can be considered valid to theological words, too: “every word … is a forerunner of the more perfect word to be revealed … in an unwritten way in the Spirit” (2:31). “The heart” of all major churches, not only of the Syrian Jacobite Church to which this Hage’s expression originally refers to, “beats in its liturgy” (2:51). And Nicephorus’s formulation of the liturgical action of “their priests” can be generalized to encompass all liturgical action and participation: “they express the form of the orders of being that transcend this world” (2:134).

Worship has a special function in “theology”, for it can convey the knowledge of the unknowable (2:135). Liturgy is “participation in divine mysteries” and “completely manifest knowledge” (2:136).

Some dogmas are always “liturgical” rather than “dogmatic” in their fundamental character. Such a dogma, preeminently, has been the Atonement (2:137-138), even more so than the doctrine of the Incarnation (5:268). These belonged more appropriately to the “rule of prayer” articulated in the ritual rather than the “rule of faith” articulated in dogmatic theology (1:339).

Although it is true, as Newman said, that all dogmas and creeds “have a place in ritual, they are devotional acts, and of the nature of prayer, addressed to God,” (5:268) whatever the metaphors employed to the doctrine of atonement – satisfaction, deification, sacrifice – they all “spoke in the accents of worship” (3:129-144).

And as for the Holy Communion or Eucharist, perhaps “no theological theory … can adequately express this mystery, which is best apprehended by and through the worship of the church” (5:298).

Everything comes together in liturgy. Pelikan summarizes: “The place that brought together the scholarly exegesis of Scripture and the devotional recitation of Scripture, the technical dogmatic vocabulary of the erudite and the inarticulate affirmation of the simple, was the ‘melody of theology’ in the liturgy” (2:137).

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

The Relation of Words and Reality

So, there’s a difference between “real” assent and mere “notional” assent. There is also a difference between agreeing and disagreeing “really” or merely “verbally”.

Words seek to express in human language a reality that exists independent of them. Much of theological thinking – and dispute – requires as constant awareness of the relationship of words to reality. For, as history has repeatedly shown, oftentimes the thinking – or disputing – revolves around “mere words” without truly reaching the reality that is at stake.

We are told to avoid an “excessive preoccupation” with terminology (5:34), and to make sure our discussions and disputations are not “merely a dispute over words” (3:22). Anselm urged that we avoid “a quarrel about words” and stick to the substantive issues (3:230). Many stalwart theologians, such as Peter of Lombard and Duns Scotus, would consign much of theological dispute, even over the Filioque, to the category of “logomachy”, to mere dispute of words (5:34).

Everyone would agree that some differences did not pertain to dogma at all and that ways of speaking did not affect salvation. But some differences of Christology are “not merely of terminology but of doctrine” (2:57).

The controversy, for example, over whether original sin had become part of the “essence” of human nature is, most agree, “more than a quarrel over terminology” (5:35). Beyond some “methodological differences” in Trinitarian doctrine lay some “ultimate, metaphysical differences in the doctrine of God itself” (2:193). A fideist caution against logomachy can easily become an attack on doctrine itself, as in the case of Milton who questioned the entire Trinitarian orthodoxy (5:34-35).

Peter of Abelard said that although Mohammed “confesses that [Christ] is the messenger of God, the Word of God, and the Spirit of God, he does not understand or confess by the terms ‘messenger,’ ‘word,’ and ‘spirit’ what we do” (3:244).

Words are important for they point towards “something that seriously qualified” them (2:30), to the “fundamental content” of dogma (3:204).

I must, however, confess that I am lost in a hermeneutical mesh and swamped in a theological thicket.

For I cannot understand what, exactly, do we mean when we say that something is (or is not) of “fundamental content”, pertains to “the dogma itself”, conveys the “essence” of the thing, and so on.

All ways of explaining the difference between “real difference” and “difference in terms” seem to beg the question: What, precisely, constitutes this difference? How do words, even so-called “orthodox” ones, relate to the reality they seek to express (especially as this reality is, at times, nearly incomprehensible to begin with)?

Thus “clarifications” that appear (and portray) to be lucid and informative reveal, when considered more carefully, a fermenting series of serious problems of meaning and distinction. As in: “Theologians continued to recognize that the fundamental content of the dogma of transubstantiation was the doctrine of the real presence, rather than a particular philosophical definition of substance and accident” (3:204).

What an amalgam of ambiguities! What does “fundamental content” here mean? How is “real presence” less philosophical than a(nother) “philosophical definition” of the mystery?

It has sometimes been suggested that the difference between philosophical language and theological language is that theological language “contains the essence” of the reality it seeks to express. Unfortunately I have, to this day, no idea what this means.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

“Hierarchies” of Doctrine

In addition for some kind of authority and criteria to settle the proper limits of doctrine, another thing seems to be certain as well. There seems to be some kind of “hierarchy of doctrines”, both as regards their complexity and their salvific value. These two may, or may not, coincide.

As far as complexity goes, the mysteries of the Trinity and of the Incarnation loom high up in the scale. One could say that their indirect, if not direct, role within the mystery of salvation is also extremely prominent. Perhaps only the doctrines of Redemption and with it the Atonement should be stressed more, although these cannot be comprehended without their proper relation to the Trinity and the Incarnation. And we should not forget the doctrines of the Resurrection or Ascension either…

Are, then, all so-called “levels of importance” fallacies?

Perhaps as far as the central Christian doctrines are concerned, one cannot set them in any hierarchy of importance. For they are all interdependent, organically springing from the same meta-mystery which is God himself and the drama of Creation.

But many have believed – and still do – a “domino theory” (5:57), according to which even the slightest alteration in orthodox doctrine has devastating effects, either immediately or eventually.

Without, for instance, a correct interpretation of the Eucharist, thought Durandus of Troarn, the integrity of the Christian faith was compromised and “the entire discipline of the Christian confession will perish” (3:185). Augustine taught that “who wants to be saved, must think this way about the Trinity” (2:191); for Bernard of Clairvaux the doctrine of the Trinity was not a speculative construct, or an exercise in dialectical subtlety, but “a soteriological necessity” (2:146); the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed stated, “This is the catholic faith; unless one believes it faithfully, one cannot be saved” (5:32).

In short, some doctrines are “a precondition for obtaining the salvation that is promised by religion”, as Harnack put it (5:268).

There are “fundamental truths” and “secondary truths”, and fundamental truth can not be ignored except “at cost of salvation” (5:57). But nearly everyone, albeit with varying criteria, affirms some form of distinction between “articles of faith” that pertained to salvation and “articles of doctrine” that do not (5:28).

The “lesser” articles of doctrine are not to be believed for salvation, but “for the integrity, connection, and neatness of someone’s theological system” (5:28). It is not wrong to defend “the truth and purity of doctrine, though within appropriate limits” (5:29).

“Faith” in these doctrines – whether salvific or non-salvific – has been defined in various ways. Faith refers either to the act of believing, to the content of what is believed, the basis of justification, to trust, to virtue, or to any combination of the aforementioned. Whatever the case, some form of distinction between “real” faith and “notional” or “conceptional” faith has always been held.

In fact, Newman uses precisely there terms. This is how he summarized his definition: “a dogma is a proposition; it stands for a notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands for the one or for the other” (5:267). Therefore “to give a real assent to it is an act of religion; to give a notional [assent] is a theological act,” by which the “real assent” of religious faith takes intellectual form (5:267).

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

Setting the Scope of Doctrine

Church fathers of the caliber of Leo have asserted that “the birth … of Christ … passes understanding,” and therefore asked “what is it that these new scrutinizers of the secrets of God suppose that they understand” (3:17; see also 3:73).

In the face of such skepticism, whether warranted or not, one is forced to ask: Whom among us and by what criteria can acknowledge the limits and proper scope of doctrine, the line “that cannot be passed”?

It is useless to go on quoting Sirach’s admonition when, indirectly, it confirms the justification of our inner compulsion to theologize. How, then, can we decide if and when articulation of a mystery is possible and to what degree?

The outcome of Luther’s consideration of predestination, among many later Lutherans, was an admonition to “keep silent about the question as a possible source of either despair or presumption” (4:219). “Reverent silence to mystery”, in this case to the mystery of the divine will, can be considered laudable. However, if Scripture (or reason) has indeed revealed something relating to this question of God’s will (or any other question), such an admonition would “defraud the faithful”, as Calvin said it did, of something necessary and useful (4:219).

Regardless of the final answer to the particular question of God’s will, “laudable silence” does imply that there exists also such a thing as “unwarranted silence” or even “dangerous silence”. Hence, we return to the truth of the inevitability of doctrine.

In the face of “a mystery that is incomprehensible until the time of revelation,” a healthier attitude is what Calvin, quoting Nicholas of Cusa, called “learned ignorance”. The “appropriate response” to mystery is neither to pry into “what the Lord has left hidden in secret,” nor on the other hand to keep silent about “what he has brought into the open,” but to “pay attention to the word of God with awe and wonder” (4:231).

In one sense this sounds like good advice. But in another sense it does not help us one bit with our question of the scope of doctrine. For in order to follow this advice we need to, first, properly locate this “mystery”, then distinguish if it truly is “left hidden in secret” or if it “has been brought into the open”, and all on the basis of the (supposedly clear) “word of God” in Scripture. For the question remains, what doctrines fall into each of these two camps?

Theologians have tried to make a list of the “too difficult questions”. Bullinger said there are three: the two natures of Christ, the fall and the origin of evil, and the mystery of the will of God in predestination (4:231). These are certainly great mysteries, but surely not even Bullinger thought Sirach’s warning absolutely forbid the contemplation of these questions, but rather just served as a certain caution against “going too far”?

But again we are begging the question and arguing in circles, for the question remains: What is too far? And on what basis?

As of yet, we have no criteria for understanding what it means to say that “of course it is impossible to pry into ‘the inner secrets of God’ himself or to understand his mysterious will” (4:331).

One thing seems to be certain. Apart from every person's right to speculate privately, everything is pointing towards the need of some form of authority to settle these questions for the church. All easy fixes, such as a naive reliance on Sirach’s admonition or on “Scripture” and their irresponsible application, simply beg the question.

If some dogmatic questions are to be “ruled out of court” or “outlawed” (2:67) as “illegitimate” for either being “offensive” or for some other reason, there must be objective criteria and a body of authority capable of implementing these criteria. The same applies for doctrines and questions that are “legitimate”.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

The Inevitability of Doctrine

Theology has to, at the same time, shun both speculation as well as doctrinal indifference, recognize its validity and limitations. It should concentrate on the task of communication.

Or as Maximus put it, “neither to concern ourselves with those things that are above us, nor to neglect the knowledge of God, but to give to others of the things that have been granted to us” (2:31). “Reverent silence” and “obliged confession” (3:220-221), not either or.

Some doctrines, such as the Eucharist or Holy Communion, have indeed produced “curious and useless investigation” and “bizarre theories” (4:53), but – and should we say precisely because of this? – faithfull expositors of Christian doctrine could (and should) not leave the problem alone.

There has always been an undulation between a form of reflection that “seeks, through reasons based on the true faith, to understand the nature of God” and a form that “holds principally to the love of God … without lofty inquiry” (4:63), although in most thinkers (including Jean de Gerson, the author of the words just quoted) both forms are present at the same time.

So, dogma was – and is – inevitable. Restoring the “proper order between doctrine and life” is the “central duty” of the church (5:55).

It is, of course, essential to “believe in Christ” personally, not only to “believe in Christ” dogmatically; but the first can not happen properly without the second, said Simeon the New Theologian (2:257).

As regards Christ, he had to be, said Simeon, what orthodox (Chalcedonian) christology had declared him to be, for only such a Christ could serve as “the exemplar” of man’s union with God (2:259). For Luther the proper understanding of the relation between the divine and the human in the person of Christ was, “not a speculative theory, but the basis for the doctrine of Christ’s work, and thus for Christian ‘consolation’” (4:160).

“Divine dogmas,” said Adlhelm, were a means of fostering the spiritual life (3:13). And true worship, reminded Nicholas of Cusa, requires a true object of worship (4:313).

But how can one know when reflection is possible and when it is not? When should we keep silent and is keeping silent impossible?

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

The Inadequacy of Doctrine

Doctrine relates to mystery; and mystery relates to the transcendental, what is above human reason.

Scripture, true to this fact, “spoke in a way that was not literally accurate, in order to enable its readers to grasp what transcended literal accuracy” (2:14), and “differed from later systematic theologies by refusing to [quoting Bushmill] ‘make up any formula of three or four lines’ that would attempt to encapsulate”, for example, the person and work of Christ (5:266).

“The knowledge of God was a knowledge of the unknown and the unknowable, in continuity with the witness of Scripture and the teachings of the fathers” (2:36). For Grundtvig dogmatic tradition was “not a part of the divine word separately from that which is written, but the content of Scripture itself as apprehended … by the church” (5:254).

The God to whom doctrines referred transcended philosophical categories, too.

According to Jacob of Edessa, even the terms used by the fathers and the councils – such as hypostasis and ousia – were inadequate (2:54).

In fact, all language was inadequate, biblical or philosophical or what not.

“Abstract or ‘spiritual’ language about God was not less figurative and ‘symbolic’, and hence no more literal or accurate, than concrete and physical metaphors were,” as Nicholas of Cusa recognized with special clarity (4:67). Each of the doctrines “pointed beyond itself to something that seriously qualified it”, and true “theological mystagogy” transcended dogma (2:30).

Scripture itself admonishes us: “Seek not what is too difficult for you, nor investigate what is beyond your power. Reflect upon what has been assigned to you, for you do not need what is hidden.” (Ecclus. 3:21-22).

This admonition of Sirach “not to seek what is too difficult for you” was embedded in the tradition of medieval thought (3:99). How is this possible considering that the high middle ages are considered the hay-day of speculative theology?

Upon closer look the admonition, in fact, allows a certain “investigation”. Erigena and Maximus, his spiritual master, both took it not only as an allowance but as a command to investigate (3:99). For investigation itself is, surely, the only way to know what is “too difficult” and “beyond our power” or “hidden” on the one hand, and what is “assigned to us” on the other.

Paradoxically, only by investigation can we find and set the limits of investigation.

Erigena, even as a “mystical theologian”, warns us that a conception, say, of transcendence beyond all existence, can make the name “God” meaningless (3:102). So-called negative theology which stressed the unknowability of God “refused to pry into the mysteries of the divine being”, admittedly, but it produced “a concentration on that which could be known” (2:259). It was the goal of Gregory of Palamas to protect both the unknowability and knowability of God (2:269). (Here we could ask, do dogmas pertain to what is “known” or “unknown” in God, but this is probably a false question.)

True theology is simultaneously both “negative” and “sublime” (2:32). Theology or doctrine is inadequate; but it is also inevitable.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

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Doctrine and Mystery

Doctrines seek to express and clarify what the church “believes, teaches, and confesses” to both its members (the faithful) and to non-members.

Doctrines should, ideally, support and guide the faithful in life, both in worship (vertical relationship) and in morals (horizontal relationship). Alterations in doctrine result in alterations in worship and morality, for better or for worse.

In this way doctrine serves as a kind of “theological map”, to use C. S. Lewis’s analogy: alterations in the accuracy of the map pertain to the sailor’s ability (or inability) to sail from harbor to harbor through seas and oceans, not only safely but also “splendidly”, if you will.

Doctrine relates to mystery. The character of their relation is at the heart of this article series. Because this relation is to some extent itself a mystery, various expressions have been suggested to capture it.

Maximus said that “dogma” (in this case of salvation as deification) “belongs to the mystery of the faith” (2:30), and doctrines were “the articulation of the mystery of truth” (2:36). According to Harnack dogmas are “doctrines of faith, formulated in concepts” and these “comprehend the knowledge of God” and present “the objective content of religion” (5:268). Erigena said that theology, understood as road to doctrine, was “human investigations” of mystery, the deep things of God (3:99), that is, “the investigation of the divine essence” (3:100).

But formulating doctrine, in other words articulating the mystery, requires the locating of the mystery first. It implies the obligation to recognize that “this is a mystery”, and then “to know it”, as Werenfels put it (3:67). This is no easy task.

Some mysteries appear more frequently among the lists of “principle mysteries of faith”. Francke regarded the problem of evil as a “mystery”; for Sturza the resurrection of the body was an “unfathomable mystery”; Scriver saw the doctrine of predestination as a “heavenly mystery”; the economy of the incarnation was a “great mystery”, said Zinzendorf; and, according to Burnet, it is above all to “the mystery of Christ upon the cross” and to Christ’s mysterious cry of dereliction that faith turned (5:67-68).

Yet of all the mysteries of the faith, the dogma of the Triune God has been, by ecumenical consent, the most fundamental and the most “sublime mystery” (5:68) -- although so-called Unitarians have (happily) dropped it.

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

This is an essay on the nature of doctrine. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan’s monographs on the development of Christian doctrine. Reference (3:241) would refer to volume 3, page 241.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

-- -- --

Doctrine is “Important”

“The Christian life must begin first of all with doctrine, from which faith flows,” wrote the Anabaptist theologian Balthasar Hubmaier (4:4), and most Reformers would have agreed. Henrich Bullinger, the German-Swiss Reformer, stated his axiom: “Doctrine is the most important thing, which stands out above all others” (4:4). Luther went so far as to say that some doctrines, foremost the sacraments, were so vital that whoever erred on them, “in even one point,” was to be avoided (4:178).

The Catholics and Orthodox of course agreed on this primacy of doctrine. It was pointed out at the Council of Trent that for the Protestant Reformers, too, the primary concern was the (supposed) “wrong teaching” of the church, from which the “wrong conduct” proceeded (4:247). In stressing the importance of, say, sacramental doctrine, the Catholics could be at least as adamant as Protestants (4:293).

John Henry Newman admitted that “from the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion”; and he had never had any serious “temptation to be less zealous for the great dogmas of the faith” (5:267).

Clearly, then, doctrine (or dogma, as I will use these two interchangeably) is and has always been supremely important.

In this article I will not trace the development of this or that specific doctrine, but rather concentrate on “doctrine” itself and seek to better understand its significance. Where lays its importance? Individual dogmas shall come into play only in reference to this broader question. Doctrine is defined as “what the church believes, teaches, and confesses on the basis of the Word of God” (1:1).

The central theme of this essay, as stated in the title, is “the inadequacy and inevitability” of doctrine, its inherent limits and proper scope respectively.

In order to do justice to such a broad theme I shall have to consider doctrine from various angles: doctrine’s relation to mystery; what exactly constitutes the limits and proper scope of doctrine; doctrine as a “map”; the possible “hierarchies” of doctrine; and its fuller “comprehension” and fulfillment in faith, and – primarily – in worshipful liturgy and in love in action.

Throughout the article the reader will be asked to keep in mind the question (which is entertained in this series but ultimately not answered): What is the relationship of dogmatic formulations and the reality they seek to formulate? In what way can it be said that dogma “reaches” or “conveys” the reality it seeks to articulate?

The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine

Over the next nine days I will publish a nine-part series on doctrine titled "The Inadequacy and Inevitability of Doctrine".

I know, I know: it sounds like a very boring and long series. For the majority of people, boringly long is what it probably will be. Come back in about two weeks for more exciting posts.

But for the weirdos who find the topic interesting (or for those of you who'll read just about anything to kill time or to escape obligations) prepare for a marathon series starting tomorrow.

1. Doctrine is “important”
2. Doctrine and mystery
3. The inadequacy of doctrine
4. The inevitability of doctrine
5. The scope of doctrine
6. “Hierarchies” of doctrine
7. The relation of words and reality
8. Liturgy as the fulfillment of doctrine
9. Love as the fulfillment of doctrine

An Update With Photos...

...can be found, not here, but here. Since my brother and his family already updated their blog, I see no point in dublicating the stories told there. Whew, saves me a lot of trouble.

Some highlights from our trip from Dar es Salaam through Tanga and Moshi up to Nairobi, Kenya, and back:

1. Sirkku ran the Kilimanjaro half-marathon during our pit stop at Moshi, near Arusha just a few hours away from the Kenian border (photos provided).
2. You can, indeed, fit a Cessna plane into the back trunk of your car (photo provided).
3. "Overseeing" a problematic two-hour tire change under the scorching sun without any sun tan lotion is possible, but not advicable (photo provided).

The Present Economical Crisis...

...forces difficult decisions. In the organisation of this picture André will probably be made redundant.