Grilled Seafood

As we live beside the sea, there are a lot of local fishermen doing their thing from dusk till dawn. They work very hard, sometimes they don't catch anything, sometimes their nets are full. Some time ago Danny bought two kilos of fresh, king-prawns directly from the fishermen. They got a higher profit than normally, but they did all the cleaning up for us. They were big. We grilled them and they tasted delicious.


Unfortunately I don't have a picture. These photos are from Good Friday, our Easter dinner. The one above was taken by Jani Salokangas who came over with his family. It's not lamb, it's beef tender-loin with big chucks of onion, with chicken and baked potatoes. Danny was (and is) the Grill Master. We've been using the grill much more at the new house.

Grandpa in the Trunk

Some time ago my parents visited us here in Tanzania. They had been invited by Fida International to participate in a one-week Disability Forum Seminar in Northern Tanzania, Tanga. Naturally, the prospect of spending time with the grand-children was attractive too.


I stayed at home in Dar es Salaam as the rest of the family drove up to Tanga for the week. It was quite crowded in the car, so Vaari (Grandpa) got his own little space in the trunk, literally. Getting in and out was a bit challenging, but apparently the "seat" itself was quite snug.

Mystery Bird

My "office" is a roof-sized terrace on top of my brother's house. I spend hours there each day, reading, writing, drinking coffee. Or just chilling, shooting crows, contemplating. The senery is superb: turquoise ocean, white beach, fishing boats, palm trees, and a multitude of different kinds birds.


One of the most beautiful birds that live in the near vicinity is the King Fisher. I still haven't caught it on camera. But there's another bird too, a very pretty one, that is almost always in sight. Here is a couple that were flying around our neighbor's roof top. Who can tell me what bird it is? I cannot recognize the species.

Maisha Poa

Maisha Poa (engl. The Good Life), a Fida-sponsored centre for street children in Nairobi, Kenya. I had the privilege to visit it a while back. Paula Konttinen (in photo) is one of my brother and his wife's collegues. A native Kenyan, Paula Konttinen has studied and lived in Finland for several years, speaks fluent Finnish and, as some of you guessed, is married to a Finn.

Maisha Poa's mission includes empowering youth by way of education and work. One project which is still on the experimental level is artefact-production, bags, boxes, and cards from hand-made paper. The paper is made from elephant dung, and I was shown the process. Hopefully soon they can start making a profit. For those of you who speak Finnish, click on the photo and check out the label text on this bag.

Obligatory Update and Photo

I've been home alone since Monday. Everything's gone extremely well. I put in 8 hours of intense study and writing each day and take it easy in the evenings. Today I saw a movie with Ellam, The Fast and the Furious 4. Not really my "thing", if you know what I mean, but Ellam is into characterless fast pace action movies. (I'm exaggerating.) After finishing this post I intend to walk upstairs to the roof terrace and enjoy a Cuban cigar. The moon is spectacular tonight and it will light up the beach and ocean brilliantly.

I have to finish writing soon, because my battery is dying -- the electricity is out after several days of unproblematic current, and I don't want to use the oversized generator. Anyway, this is just an obligatory update. And this photo is the obligatory photo for the grandparents. Yes you, Grandma and Vaari, Mummi ja Pappa.


Daniella and Benjy love dogs, as you know, although they are also a little afraid of them. In this picture Daniella is meeting Sheba, the blind dog I blogged about last week, for the first time. Daniella is very courageous, as you can see. (I on the other hand am a bit apprehensive, hence Sheba's tight collar. I have a firm grip of it with my hidden right hand, just in case).

Blind Shepherd

This is Sheba. She is our neighbors' German Shepherd. They have another dog, Spot, a white Jack Russell named after the black patch on her back. When you take Sheba (and Spot) with you for a walk or a jog on the beach, Sheba will place herself between you and anyone in the vicinity, a fellow jogger running towards you or any person chilling at the beach. If someone comes too close, Sheba will gently push them away (while on the move). What makes her special is that she is blind.

Shooting Crows

Domestic Tanzanian crows are fine birds. They're like Indian black crows (in the picture) but a bit larger and have white chests. Their Indian cousins, however, are a true menace. Originally imported from India for their "handy" ability to keep the streets clean, or so the story goes, they are simply everywhere nowadays. They're noisy, arrogant, and like most crows extremely intelligent. They're also egg-thieves, as we say in Finnish, for they destroy the nests of smaller birds.


So Danny and I found a new hobby. Crow-shooting. We have an airgun (or bee-bee gun) which we borrowed from a friend. Whoever has used an airgun knows that it's nearly impossible to hit a flying bird. But of my "hits" 25%, three crows in total, have fallen from the sky. I won't say what my total count is though... Danny made an incredible shot today. He hit a flying crow from 15 meters in the eye. But I won't post an illustrative photo for fear of losing friends.

Babysitting Benjamin

Danny and Sirkku went to have dinner with a few Finnish colleagues from Fida International. There's a nice restaurant just half a mile from the new house called Mediterranean. I decided to stay at home with Daniella and Benjy. Quite soon after her parents had left and after her late-night noodles, Daniella fell asleep peacefully. Benjy and I stayed up to watch movies.

But lo and behold, Sirkku and Danny returned home early! They made it to the restaurant, but no one else ever came. Apparently the rain earlier today had been so heavy that many roads were still cut off completely. So the other Finns enjoyed a meal in a separate restaurant closer to town while Danny and Sirkku spent quality time together at Mediterranean. And me, what did I have for supper? Fresh prawns, bought directly from local fishermen off the beach (and then grilled) in the backyard. No complaints here.

What is Worship?

Part I, Part II, Part III

This is an article on the nature of worship. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan's five-part marathon history of the development of Christian doctrine. Reference 4:45 would mean book 4, page 45.

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To begin with, we should be careful with liberal uses of the word “worship” when addressed to saints. Historically it has been used for a lack of a better word before “veneration” became the proper word to express a devotional disposition towards saints.

But some, like Jean de Gerson, went as far as to straightforwardly suggest “adoring” Mary and saluting her as “the goddess of love” is “not going too far” (4:41-42). This, to me, blurs the distinction between “adoration” and “veneration” and undermines the “absolute qualitative distinction” between God and man that was mentioned above.

“Superstitions and abuses” concerning, for example, the relics of saints included “trafficking” and selling them (3:179), historically called the sin of simony. “Idolatry” included treating a creature with greater honor than is his due, namely, said Socinus, “honor that is clearly divine, and requiring from him those things that can and should be requested from God alone” (4:329). It is not explained what kind of honor is “clearly divine”, so this begs the question – yet again.

But elsewhere we find an instance of what can be requested from God alone: it was “essential to avoid … the notion that saints conferred grace” or that they “could rescue souls from hell” (4:261).

But it was as essential to avoid the opposite extreme too, “the hoary objection that the veneration of the saints was idolatrous” (4:261).

The potential threat of devotional practices to the integrity of monotheistic worship has not, of course, gone unnoticed. Counter-measures against excesses of devotion have taken many forms. Above all it has been necessary to remember where the true origin of saints’ honor lay.

The opening verse of the Latin version of the last psalm read: “Praise the Lord in his saints” (Ps. 150:1, Vulg.) and what this meant, explained Bernard of Clairvaux, was that “if I discern something in the saints that is worthy of praise and admiration, I find, when I examine it in the clear light of truth, that though they appear to be admirable and praiseworthy, it is Another than they who is really so, and I praise God in his saints”

The saints’ virtues had their origin in God, not in the saints themselves (4:177). Furthermore, saints are venerated “not for their benefit, but for ours,” since “the saints have no need of our honors, nor do they gain anything as a result of our devotion” (4:176).

One Catholic friend of mine, a layman, offered a few possible symptoms, concrete examples that would imply an unhealthy disposition towards saints. Among these were: “one does not pray directly to God anymore”; “does not understand, that the role of the saints is to direct us to Jesus – see Mary’s advice at the wedding at Cana: ‘Do whatever he says’ (John 2:1-11)”; “is attached to a saint but forgets God”; and “neglects the sacraments and the reading of Scripture through which one gets to know Jesus.”

Clichtove’s treatise from the sixteenth century, The Veneration of the Saints, traced the development of the practice of veneration, Pelikan comments, “with such balance and care that, despite Protestant attacks, it continued to serve as a model” (4:260) for a considerable time. Through a proper veneration of the saints, Clichtove urged against critique, the glory of God was not diminished but magnified (4:261).

(We find an echo of this in the order of loves. The type of love that pertains to Christian love is charity or agape, divine self-sacrificing love, the word John used when he said that “God is love [agape]”. When we love, agape, our neighbor, we love them through God, who is the source of love, and we love God through them, who are images of God, provided the order of our loves is proper. In this way Christ’s two commandments form one “great commandment”. They are two sides of the same coin.)

All we can take away from the above is that “worshipful adoration” of God means worshiping him for his own sake; whereas “worshipful respect” of saints means honoring them not for their own but for God’s sake.

In light of the degree/quality distinction, this, strictly speaking really amounts to neither. They’re not different qualities of worship, nor are they worship of different degree. Rather, there’s a difference in one’s basic attitude and understanding of why one worships. Does one worship the object for its own sake or for the sake of something beyond the object?

One could say that if this – one’s basic attitude – is really what we are looking at, if this is the only distinction, it is no wonder that the “accusation of idolatry and the response to it struck at a deep and sensitive point in Christian belief” (2:127). But, as with sacrifice, one’s basic attitude may make a greater difference than we may think. To this too, then, I shall have to return later.

From degree to quality: sacrifice and “basic attitude”

Let’s recap again. Here is the crux of the problem set in a historical context:

“From Augustine’s City of God came the explanation of the fundamental difference between the cult of the saints and the Pagan practices to which Protestant critics were comparing it. The ‘adoration’ paid to the Creator pertained to him alone, the ‘adoration’ of saints was that appropriate to God’s creatures; strictly speaking, ‘the church does not adore saints … but honors them.’ Christ was the only ‘Mediator of redemption,’ but the saints were ‘mediators of intercession.’” (4:261.)

It is probably clear by now that I find this distinction of “adoration to God only” and “veneration of saints” only partly helpful. It differentiates between the object of honoring, but it does not substantiate as to how the acts of honoring differ except as far as their object goes. So Augustine’s “explanation” begs the question. Over and over again I have pressed for a difference in the acts themselves, not only in their objects.

But we haven’t said all that can be said about “sacrifice” as a constituent of worship.

I said earlier that sacrifice belonged to both worship and veneration, if – but only if – the difference between them was only a difference of degree. And in this case sacrifice had to be defined vaguely as “something” that could be offered to both God and man. But, as it is, theologically sacrifice is defined as something that belongs to God solely. And in this case, what follows is that the difference between worship and veneration is not, after all, merely a difference of degree, but of quality as well.

Everyone agrees that “the merit of salvation” (4:261) belongs solely to Jesus. There is such a sacrifice which belongs to worship only. We are talking about the sacrifice for the atonement of sins. Offering such a sacrifice to a creature rather than to the Creator would be idolatry. And asking for forgiveness of sins from a creature rather than from the true God would be idolatry.

The cult of the saints did not imply that “the church offers sacrifices to the [saints], but only to the one God, the God of the [saints] and our God,” explained Remigius of Auxerre centuries ago (3:176). The only one to whom Christ could “offer the sacrifice of his passion,” said Robert Pullen, “was the One whom he was obeying by his suffering” (3:139).

It is the “sacrifice of his passion” (3:139), the “body of Christ” (3:136). The Catholics believe that in the Eucharist the power of Christ’s once-for-all sacrifice – for Christ is not, to be sure, “crucified” each time anew – becomes manifest. (For Christians who don’t hold onto the sacrificial character of the Holy Communion such talk is likely to sound odd, if not blasphemous.)

But it is not only Christ’s suffering that is sacrificed to God only. Worship implies the “sacrifice” of each person’s life to God, understood as “a total commitment” to him only.

One Catholic friend of mine, a priest, explained what “a total commitment” meant for him. A worshipful disposition toward God includes at least the following (which, he was at pains to emphasize, can never be said of a saint): “acknowledging that the recipient of worship is the Creator and thus the rightful Lord of every creature”; “’letting God know’ that he is the rightful Lord of one’s being”; “knowing that you have been created and accepting it, and the voluntary transformation of this knowledge into worship”; “the coming together of humility and freedom in forming your inner attitude”; and “worshiping God unreservedly, that is, obeying him unreservedly.”

In Catholic tradition “worship” is clearly sacrificial in character, whereas other “types of reverence” which are directed to the saints are non-sacrificial. Of the latter, a further distinction is made between ordinary reverence (“dulia”) to saints in general and a higher form of reverence (“hyperdulia”) to Christ’s mother. This said, my friend said that it was important to remember that “hyperdulia” was not a “third” form of reverence in between sacrificial “adoration” and non-sacrificial “dulia”, but it belonged fully to the category of “dulia”.

We finally come to the end of this article. We shall close with saying something about the “basic attitude” which, as noted earlier, affects a difference between worship and veneration. But earlier I questioned its significance: I asked whether “mere attitude” can make the crucial difference.

But at the end of the day, when all outer criteria for evaluating the “purity” of one’s worship fails, isn’t one’s attitude – largely hidden from observers and fully seen only by God – at the heart of this issue after all?

Does not one’s attitude make all the difference in one’s spiritual – and moral – life? What happens outwardly is not unimportant, but it is secondary; an echo of what takes place in the soul. Isn’t one’s attitude what distinguishes murder from accident, authentic friendship from selfish manipulation – and worship of God from self-love (the story of the praying Pharisee)?

What is Worship?

Part I, Part II, Part III

This is an article on the nature of worship. References are to Jaroslav Pelikan's five-part marathon history of the development of Christian doctrine. Reference 4:45 would mean book 4, page 45.

-- -- --

Historical attempts at differentiation

Now, I must admit that as far as my central questions are concerned, Pelikan’s monographs offered me no new insights, though they frequently employed the terms “worship” or “adoration” and “veneration” – and even attempted to differentiate between them. Well, the monographs didn’t need to as they were books on the development of dogma, not books on basic theological questions. The author must presume that the readers know the answers to elementary theological questions, like “What is worship?” (or as for my other article, “Why is doctrine important?”). I didn’t. I don’t.

It truly was a challenge to sail through the 2,000 pages on the lookout for clarity, especially when the author often used “worship” and “veneration” interchangeably (see, for example, 2:96-99, 106). This was very odd. Why would he do that? I doubt that a theologian of his caliber would not distinguish between them in his private thinking, so it must be presumed that he was trying to faithfully follow the belief of his sources as it chronologically developed.

For early on in the chapter “Images of the Invisible” in the second volume we get the first (yet still minimalist) definition of worship: it is “paying honor” (2:103). The definition, though welcome, is unfortunately not very helpful, for it does not explain what “paying honor” means – and surely one can “pay honor” to both God and people, so “paying honor” belongs to veneration as well as to worship.

But later, a need for clarification and distinction becomes clearer. Eastern theologians made it clear that “it was one thing to pay proper respect [τιμή] to the saints, quite another to address worship [προσκύνησις] to them, and yet another to portray them in worshipful images” (2:112). But this distinction too, though welcomed, remains one of mere terminology, for “paying proper respect” and “addressing worship” are not defined.

Eventually the question that bothers me was raised in a straightforward manner. The italics are mine:

The orthodox “were obliged to set forth a theory of worship that would protect the uniqueness of the worship of the true God and yet permit other acts of reverence”.

When iconoclasts argued that “there is only one kind of worship, not many kinds,” the orthodox replied that “this is true of the worship of adoration [λατρευτική]” but that the worship of mortals “was nevertheless permissible by analogy and derivation from the single worship of God”. There was a “worship of adoration, which we pay only to the God who is by nature adorable”, but there was also a worship paid to “the friends and worshipers of God” for his (God’s) sake, because of “their derivative divine nature; this included both angels and saints”.

“Adoration pertained only to God, but either by love or by reverence or by law one was also bound to other to whom one paid worshipful respect. This distinction was grounded in biblical evidence about worship paid to creatures by men whose adoration of the one true God was beyond reproach.” (2:126.)

But even the distinctions above pertain only to the object of the reverential act, not to the act itself.

But as said, “adoration” in its technical sense as distinguished from “veneration”, could be offered to God alone. Saints could be venerated and even glorified, but only God could Anselm of Canterbury (who thought God was present even in the holy cross) “adore, venerate, and glorify” (3:132). One theologian said that “[e]ven though the saints are [sometimes] called ‘gods,’ they are not worshiped; only Christ is called ‘God’ and is worshiped” (3:55). “Believing in Christ,” said another theologian, meant “venerating and loving the Logos” (whereas “believing Christ” meant simply affirming “that he speaks what is true”) (3:4). If the “preexistent Son of God incarnate” was not in Jesus, “the worship of Jesus would be idolatry” (3:248).

“[W]hile the worship paid to the icons was one of honor rather than of adoration,” explained Cyril of Alexandria, “the worship paid to the Eucharist was one of adoration rather than merely of honor, because the presence in the Eucharist was that of the Lord himself” (2:291). If Christ, who was present in the Eucharist, was not true God, “there would be no reason to venerate the elements [of the Holy Communion] as the worship of the church did” (3:200). The elements were “adored”, but “such worship, addressed to a mere symbol of the body of Christ, would be idolatrous” (4:55).

Idolatry is precisely what it was (and is), according to Protestant critics of the practice.

But everyone agreed on this point, however: we are not to “adore or worship anything except the true God” (3:68) and “[t]he catholic faith is this … that we worship one God in Trinity” (3:19).

As for veneration, of all the saints Mary was “the woman who uniquely deserved to be venerated”, said Bernard of Clairvaux (3:162), one of her most ardent devotees. Her unique relationship with Christ was the basis of her uniqueness.

“Expressions of devotions” or “devotional expressions” to her (3:171), and in her honor, could include, say, the praying of the rosary and the commemoration of events in her life, like her birth, the “immaculate conception”. It was fitting that “veneration and prayer” should be addressed to her – which Pelikan calls “such worship of the Virgin” (making my head spin because of yet another “liberal” use of the word “worship”).

Not every theologian even during the Middle Ages was happy with the growing cult of Mary, but most were (3:178-179).

Yet Mary was not God. “The absolute necessity for a qualitative distinction between Christ and Mary,” Pelikan explains, “served as a restraint” (4:40; also 3:165-168) on the tendency of going too far, on “possible excesses of devotion” (3:176).

In search of concrete criteria

If find these “possible excesses of devotion” very interesting. Not from a (Protestant) polemical point of view, but from the point of view of establishing possible criteria for distinguishing between “true worship of God only” on one hand, and “idolatry” and “proper veneration of the saints” on the other. You see, there must be a way to differentiate and evaluate.

Let me expalin. In science, there is such a thing as “pseudo-theory”. Pseudo-theory is a theory or belief system, which cannot be refuted. It cannot be refuted, not because it is a “perfect theory”, but simply because it is eternally flexible: whatever you throw at it is absorbed and interpreted in its favour.

Marxism has been thought to be one such theory. Literally whatever you say in attempt to criticize it, it can respond by saying: “Well of course, that’s exactly what we should expect if Marxism was true.” If you say “White” it will reply, “Of course, white is what was to be expected.” But saying “Not-white” will give you the exact same reply, “Of course, not-white supports our theory.” How can one argue constructively with such responses?

Some social sciences, too, like sociology and social psychology, are sometimes dangerously close to being (at least partly) pseudo-scientific or mere tautology, as Alisdair MacIntyre has shown (After Virtue 1981). And the theory of evolution has been receiving a lot of flak lately for precisely its pseudo-scientific aura.

But the point here is not this or that theory of science, but only to acknowledge that the “cult of the saints” too, in order to make any sense, needs some criteria for knowing when “veneration” has become “excessive” (and in what way) or when it has turned into “idolatry” (worship of creature). Without such criteria the practice of veneration saints is “pseudo-scientific”, so to say.

“Superstitions and excessive credulity in the cult of saints” (4:248), it goes without saying, is to be shunned, but this advice is totally useless if it is not explained what such “superstitions” and “excessive credulities” could possibly be!

Well, what could they be?

What is Worship?

Part I, Part II, Part III

Some time ago I posted an article titled "What is worship?" I asked for comments and through email got several, from both Protestant and Catholic friends. The Catholics were more active. So, in response to my (slightly) increased understanding I have re-written the article. What follows in as extended, I hope both in length and in substance, version of my original article.

References are to Jaroslav Pelikan's five-part marathon history of the development of Christian doctrine. Reference 4:45 would mean book 4, page 45.

-- -- --

There was one question that loomed large in my mind as I read through Pelikan’s monographs. In fact there were two, but the second – “What is the point of dogma?” – has been discussed in a separate article. Both questions are theological questions that seem simple. Almost too simple to entertain seriously, but when further reflected on, they prove to be absolutely fundamental for a Christian, whether layman or theologian. I was hoping to find, if not proper answers to them, at least a satisfactory articulation of the questions themselves. The one I must discuss here is:

What is worship?

Indeed, what is worship? What exactly do we mean when we say we “worship” God?

We Christians believe that worship is the proper response of creature towards Creator. We believe that worship is the primary calling of man in relation to God. One could say that love is this primary calling. Yes, for our purposes here worship and love may be treated as one. Both overlap each other, and both are prerequisites for happiness in the truest sense (“human flourishing”).

We also believe that the object of worship must be the “true God”, not our construction of him, otherwise we worship and idol (in other words we are “idolizers”). Also, not only the object of worship but worship itself must be “true” or “right”, otherwise it is imperfect at best and meaningless at worst (making us unjust towards our Creator to whom, and only to whom, true worship is due).

Now, what constitutes worship? Or, put another way: How does worship towards God differ from a proper disposition towards other things, like people?

Catholics and Orthodox make a distinction between “worship” and “veneration”. The first, when applied to God is proper, and when applied to creatures (mainly to the saints and foremost to Mary) is not only improper but also a mortal si. The second, when applied to saints is proper, and when applied to God is either proper or meaningless apart from worship.

Thus far this distinction, however, is only object and of terminology. Where lays the “real” difference in the act itself, the difference in terms of “substance”, the difference that counts, the difference that can be experienced and observed in reality?

Or is what is “given” in worship and veneration the same, but just directed to different objects? Or if not, then what, exactly, is reserved for God only that is constituent to worship and not veneration?

Difference of degree or quality?

Let’s assume there is a real difference between worship and veneration. Is the difference a difference of degree or a difference of quality? To use an analogy, is veneration a mild electric current which, as it grows stronger, approaches worship (difference of “degree”), or is veneration a mild electric current and worship something quite different, like fire (difference of “quality”)?

What, then, if the difference is that of degree?

In traditional theology of love we speak of an “order of loves” (ordo amoris/caritatis). Loving objects in the proper order and in the right way is the (or a) key of right worship.

Is this backed by Scripture? It would seem so. The disciples asked Jesus of the proper “order of commandments”.

“The most important one,” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength.’ The second is this: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no commandment greater than these.” (Mark 12:29-31.) Implicit in Jesus’ answer is an order of loves: the most important thing is to love God, and secondly, you must love your neighbor as yourself.

Since we have treated worship and love as partly interchangeable, what follows is some kind of “order of worship”. “Proper worship” would be “a proper order of worship”: God merits our highest form of reverence (which we call “worship”), and lesser things merit a lower form of reverence (which we call “veneration”). The right order is the “measure” and difference of proper worship and veneration. If the order is wrong, worship and veneration become corrupted in some sense.

So, we’ve established an order of things. What else can be said? By connecting worship to love and by establishing an order of worship we’ve found part of the answer to our question. But, the core of the question still remains: What, exactly, is worship (or love)?

Jesus provides another key when he says that: “If you love me, keep my commandments” (John 14:15) and: “The person who has my commandments and keeps them is the one who loves me” (John 14:21). This is helpful. Love/worship is doing the will of God. (Here I am not going to ask if obeying, “works”, is merely the fruit of love, “faith”. I take it that they are organically connected.)

Continuing with the degree paradigm, we can add sacrifice as one constituent of worship/love. It is remembered that agape, the love which “God is”, is self-sacrificial. Now, what is sacrifice? This is a difficult question, and though I will address it here and again at the end of this article, an exhaustive answer cannot be offered.

But our presuppositions imply that if worship belongs to the degree category, and if sacrifice is constituent of worship, it follows that sacrifice also belongs to the degree category (if not also to “quality”). From this it follows that, if the “order” is right, sacrifice can be directed and offered both to the Creator and to the creature. This makes sense: humans often “make sacrifices” for each other, especially for spouses and children, and we commend them for that.

But we have to return to the sacrificial character of worship later: it might be the crux of the question.

We left many important questions unanswered. But, if the difference between worship and veneration is that of degree, at least we’ve established a few things. We know that worship, veneration, and love are all intimately connected. Their legitimacy or illegitimacy depends on the proper order of their objects. Worship of God implies doing God’s will. Lastly, worship is sacrifice (whatever that is).

So, when we say that we “worship God”, if our words are backed by our whole being, we are saying at least the following: that we love him, that we love him above all else, that we love our neighbors as ourselves, and that our love is sacrificial. We understand that we haven’t said what “sacrifice” is, and we understand that worshiping God requires knowing him (we cannot worship what we don’t know – worship and love require the right object).