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Political theory #1: Matter vs. Spirit
Political theory #2: Origin of Change--Law or Conscience?
Political theory #3: Christian Politician's Dilemma
The third and final theoretical question concerning politics I have labeled as the "Christian Politician's Dilemma". In truth, it is a universal dilemma pertaining to everybody, Christian or not, but Christians, I suspect, may be more aware of it.
As noted earlier, democracy does not guarantee just legislation, just as legislation does not weild the authority to say what is wrong or right objectively. It is the job of democracy and legislation to attempt to protect objective truth. But objective truth remains objective truth whether or not democracy has succeeded in enshrining it in legislation or not.
Now, there are two levels to morality in relation to legislation. The first level constitutes both what is morally wrong and what is legally wrong. Here morality and legislation meet. Examples of such are, for instance, theft, murder, and the like. Theft and murder are objectively wrong, and all countries acknowledge them as legally wrong too. The second level of morality, however, constitutes what is wrong morally, but not legally. Here morality and legislation may not meet. Examples of these are, for example, adultery (in Western societies) and hurting another person's feelings. Cheating and malevolent insults are both morally wrong, but you don't go to jail for them.
My question is: How is one to decide what things should belong to the first (both morality and legislation) and what to the second (only morality) levels? On what basis is something made illegal and another not, though both are wrong?
This distinction is a "Western" one, I think. As far as I understand Muslim theology, it makes little or no distinction between religion and society. Sharia law is the perfect integration of Islamic Quranic precepts into the legislation of the society. Thus, our example of adultery, among many other things, would be punishable by law too. This was quite common in ancient Judaism, and in Christianity not long ago.
Politics, as we know, is all about morality. Taking care of the common good. Rarely does one hear the naive call to "Keep morality out of politics!" anymore. However, "Keep religion out of politics!" and "Keep the Bible out of politics!" are still trendy accusations. These two can be stated in a more satisfactory way. What is meant by them is: Keep those parts of your religion or your holy book out of politics which we disagree with. For, of course, no one would say we need to legalize theft because it is forbidden in the Bible.
The reason I mused about the Christians being, perhaps, more aware of this question (two levels of morality) in society is that Christians follow the Bible. The two levels become more apparent to them because of this. The Christian Politician, as s/he pursues to uphold justice in the society, has to decide the criteria for judging whether a certain niche of morality ought to be "elevated" to the level of legislation too.
I once put this question to the ex-Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party in Finland. He acknowledged the two levels after he understood that making, say, adultery illegal would be problematic. But he admitted to me that he had never thought about this question before. "Well think about it, and I might vote for you," I said with a smile. A friend of mine told me St. Thomas of Aquinas has given this question some thought, but I haven't been able to locate where.
1 year ago
3 comments:
My friend Oskari sent the following comments:
Q #3: I think that to Aristotle and St Thomas, the main reason why an
immorality should not always be made illegal is that there would some certain or likely negative consequences that outweigh the benefit of making it legal. (N.B. I just realised that what I said may sound awfully utilitarian or consequentialist; however, it's not because the point is not about defining right and wrong be reference to their
consequences alone, but about the advisability of enacting certain
laws; the main reason aspect that one must examine in legislating is
precisely the consequences; the other aspects of the moral act –
intention, the act itself, and other circumstances – are less relevant to our discussion, although they are of course relevant to the legislator in the act of legislating.)
I think St Thomas called "determinatio" the specific act of the intellect that must discern such practical issues. It is not directly a moral judgment, but the application of general principles to a concrete situation. It is of course guided by the habit of prudence.
On the issue of "keeping religion out of politics", you may be
interested in reading some of the writings of Robert P. George and
John Finnis. (I can also find and send them to you if you've
interested.)
---
Generally, if there seems to be a common theme here. You say St Thomas may have something on this, but you cannot locate where. I have one book here in Bulevardi that may help you: it's called "Making Men
Moral" by Robert P. George. It will also give you the references to
Aristotle and St Thomas. And much more.
So I finally got the book my friend Oskari recommended to me. It is called "Making Men Moral" by Robert P. George. As Oskari promised it would, it did tackle the exact dilemma that is at the center of this 3rd political theory question.
Here are some relevant quotes that I found very helpful, although not exhaustive.
"There are morally valuable institutions, such as marriage, which, while not morally obligatory for everyone, are nevertheless worthy of protection. To defend such institutions from forces and developments in society that may threaten them, legislators will need to understand their nature, value, and vulnerability. It will be complicated, then, for legislators to design laws that protect institutions such as marriage. To ban an act such as adultery on the ground of its intrinsic immorality is fairly straighforward (if difficult to enforce); to design just and good laws pertaining to marital break-ups, divorce, and the care of children, however, is not so simple." (p. 40.)
Here's another one. It is a quote form St. Aquinas.
"(The law should not forbid) all vices from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, form which it is possible for the majority to abstain and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintainted: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like." (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 96, a. 2, reply.)
And here is one more. Robert P. George, taking the cue from Aquinas, identifies a number of prudential (and, as such, morally significant) considerations which might militate in favour of a policy of toleration certain moral evils (p. 42). For example:
(1) the need to avoid placing dangerous powers in the hands of governments that are likely to abuse them;
(2) the danger that criminalization of certain vices may have the effect of placing monopolies in the hands of organized criminals who will market and spread the vices more efficiently;
(3) the risk of producing secondary crimes against innocent parties;
(4) the risk of diverting police and judicial resources away form the prevention and prosecution of more serious crimes;
(5) the concern that the power to enforce moral obligations will be exploited by puritanical, prudish, or disciplinarian elements in society to repress morally legitimate activities and ways of life whose genuine value these elements fail to appreciate;
(6) the danger of establishing too much authority and creating a situation in which people relate primarily to a central authority whom they must constantly work to avoid offending, thus discouraging them from building genuine relationships with each other to the point of true friendships and valuable communities.
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